Casual Musings on War

What’s the worst decision with long-term consequences in American sports history? The Red Sox trading Babe Ruth to the Yankees? The Portland Trailblazers passing on Michael Jordan and instead selecting Sam Bowie with the second pick of the 1984 NBA draft? Nico Harrison trading away Luka Dončić?

Hindsight is 20/20, and I’m sure each of the decisions listed above were made after intense contemplation and scrutiny from several parties involved.  

But players in history aren’t judged on how they weighed the pros and cons of a major decision. Judgement is delivered based on how said decision unfolds, what were the benefits or gains of it, and what did it cost in the end.

President Lyndon B. Johnson claimed he felt trapped by whether to give the go ahead for boots on the ground in Vietnam, something akin to a Chinese finger trap: the harder you press, the worse it gets. History continues to judge LBJ quite harshly to this day over his giving of the green light. 10 years later, 58,281 American dead with 303,644 wounded, I think judgement is duly warranted.

We recently passed the fourth anniversary of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The most destructive war on the European continent since WWII continues to grind on with neither side holding a decisive edge over the other.

As of the writing of this post, 1,467 days have passed since the first Russian tank crossed the border toward Kyiv. For reference, it took 1,415 days from the beginning of Operation Barbarossa (Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1942) to Germany’s surrender in May 1945, which led to the deaths of 25 million people. On June 11 of this year, the current Ukraine-Russia conflict will have lasted longer than the First World War.

These morbid milestones led me to an interesting article from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (I’ll never stop promoting CSIS, they do great work). Vladimir Putin launched this operation in the belief that Ukrainian resistance would disintegrate, their leadership captured, and full Russian control would be established in the capitol within 72 hours. The following charts explain how his decision has played out.

Russia Has Suffered an Unprecedented Number of Fatalities

Assessing casualties in wartime is a difficult endeavor for a couple reasons 1) war is chaos 2) both sides have incentive to inflate or shrink the numbers for political purposes. The Russian Ministry of the Defense (MoD), Ukrainian MoD, and U.S. State Department all tally differing numbers when it comes to Russian losses, hence the above range of 275K-325K estimated battlefield dead.

But try to wrap your head around that figure. Three fully packed SEC sized stadiums of people in an age of warfare that many thought had left casualty numbers of this magnitude behind.

Just so we’re clear on the term “casualty”, it means any combatant that has been killed, wounded, captured, deserted, or missing, essentially no longer able to fight. That figure above isn’t number of casualties, it’s fatalities. Estimated Russian casualties currently stand at  greater than 1.2 million, more than the population of Rhode Island.

In 2025 alone, the State Department published a report detailing estimates of 415K casualties including 100K-130K deaths. Think back to that paragraph on American casualties in Vietnam. The Russian Army suffered twice the amount of deaths in Ukraine in 12 months of fighting than the United States did in 10 years of active combat in Vietnam.

There’s another detail about the above statistics I want to point out that gives a different perspective. The death to total casualty ratio is a stat that measures the amount of killed on the battlefield as compared to the total casualty rate. For reference, the United states suffered a death-to-casualty ratio of 1:7 in Iraq and 1:8 in Afghanistan, in Vietnam it was 1:5, and during the Second World War 1:2. If you think deeply about it enough, you see a clear trend here. As time has progressed, combat medicine both on the battlefield and at field hospitals off the battlefield has improved by orders of magnitude leading to typical wounds no longer being fatal. Additionally, methods of evacuating casualties off the battlefield have changed dramatically over the last 80 years, none more so than the application of helicopters.

As it stands, Russia is staring down the barrel of a 1:4 ratio in Ukraine. By modern standards, this ratio describes an underfunded rebel force fighting in Syria, not what many considered the most powerful land army in Europe four short years ago.

The discrepancy between the Russian and American figures can be explained in a few ways:

1. The United States military goes to great lengths to give the best battlefield medical attention in existence, not just in the training of its medics, but also the dedication of whole detachments of very expensive helicopters for the sole purpose of evacuating wounded. This isn’t just done for ethical reasons (which of course is the primary reason), but also each soldier is seen as a huge investment of time and resources (~$400,000 over the course of 4 years of enlistment, on average) that is not easily replaced.
2. A large portion of Russian forces currently in Ukraine are a result of multiple different conscription efforts to plug gaps. There were reports of prisons being emptied to fill the ranks of Russian units devastated by attritional warfare. In short, Moscow doesn’t view the loss of these soldiers as inherently tragic, cannon fodder is thrown around too often but may legitimately apply here.
3. The nature of the war lends itself to high death rates. The war has devolved into one that is both highly attritional and static. The advent of major drone use at the squad level has turned the battlefield into an ocean of sensors. It is impossible to move out in the open without being spotted immediately. Units are forced to limit movement as much as possible to hide from hordes of drones that stalk the frontline. Because of this, Russian leadership refuses to risk valuable assets such as armored vehicles or helicopters for medevac purposes. Every day men die from treatable wounds sustained in their trenches who would have otherwise survived long enough to make it to a field hospital 10 years ago.  

With the spring fighting season rapidly approaching, Russian casualties are expected to eclipse 1.5 million by mid-2026.

Russia Is Advancing at Historically Slow Rates

Russia’s slow rate of advance in multiple offensives over the last two years underscores the attritional nature of the war in Ukraine and the difficulty of breaking through fortified defensive positions. Here’s a quick anecdote to drive this home:

• After Russia won control of the city of Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in February 2024, Russian forces began a sustained offensive aimed at the nearby city of Pokrovsk, a key logistics and transportation hub that supported Ukrainian operations across the eastern front line. The offensive relied on infantry assaults, heavy artillery shelling, drone attacks, and glide bomb strikes to erode Ukrainian positions. From late February 2024 to early January 2026, Russian forces advanced just under 50 km, at an average pace of only about 70 meters per day.
• After capturing Avdiivka, Russia also intensified its effort against the nearby city of Chasiv Yar, which is located just west of Bakhmut. Ukrainian defenders leveraged both natural and man-made features in the fighting, including Chasiv Yar’s elevated terrain and a canal, which complicated Russian movement and repeatedly forced contested crossings. Russia relied on artillery and glide bomb strikes, drone attacks, and small assault groups to advance. In the summer of 2025, Russian forces took control of most of the city, but they have been unable to eliminate the remaining pockets of Ukrainian troops and secure full control. From late February 2024 to early January 2026, Russian forces advanced roughly 10 km, at an average pace of approximately just 14 meters per day

These rates of progress are slower than the July 1916 Battle of the Somme, one of the more infamous WWI battles known for slow rates of advance and known for British forces suffering 60,000 casualties in the first four hours.

In that first battle I mentioned, Russia suffered nearly 30,000 casualties. In the second, nearly 5,000. The sacrificing of a small town’s population worth of soldiers to seize a football field’s worth of land is not uncommon in this war.

It’s a baffling concept to wrap one’s head around: we had thought we moved on to less barbaric styles of warfare only for the meatgrinder of WWI to return to Eastern Europe.

Russia Has Seized ~20% of Ukrainian Territory Since 2014

There’s a funny scene in the middle of the Idaho hit Napoleon Dynamite movie from 2004. After working 10 hard hours on a chicken farm in the dead of summer, Napoleon gets home to count his pay (paid entirely in coins because the farmer forgot his checkbook), only to realize was able to garner $1 per hour wasting away a Saturday.

The United States suffered ~450,000 dead during the Second World War. As a result of that victory, the US became the clear leader of the western world, by far the largest economic and industrial power, dominated global financial markets, and wrote the rules for a new world order still in existence to today.

If this war in Ukraine drags on through 2026, Russia is on pace to suffer a similar number of dead, with the grand prize of 1/5^th  of Ukraine’s (mostly destroyed) territory, about the size of Pennsylvania.

That’s  1/16^th of a square kilometer per casualty (a little bit smaller than that chicken farm). That’s not exactly the buffer zone Putin envisioned at the beginning, but only 480K square kilometers to go.

Russian GDP Growth is Beginning to Stagnate

This final chart is the one I hope really lands this plane. The haunting effects of war aren’t just the holes in hundreds of thousands of families that can never be filled again. A war of this magnitude always summons consequences whose impacts will cause suffering for decades after the final bomb detonates.  

Those two years of +4.0% GDP growth were driven strictly through massive increases in government spending to fuel the war effort, a short-term drug high with a devastating hangover.

You can grow your economy through two forces: population growth and productivity growth. A healthy economy such as the United States grows both at the same time at modest paces.

Population growth is increased through two means, a birth rate above 2.1 kids per woman or immigration. Russia is hemorrhaging in both areas. Prior to the war, Russian populations had been in severe decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union, dropping from 148 million to 143 million today due to a 1.4 child per woman birth rate, emigration out of the country, and high mortality rates chiefly among males.

This war has accelerated all of the negative points made above. The most obvious being deaths on the battlefield. However, other factors not typically thought of also include lower birth rates due to men being stuck on frontlines for years at a time. Additionally, it’s estimated 3 million young Russians fled the country at the start of the war for greener pastures abroad. To make matters worse, these emigrants were disproportionally more educated and wealthier making their loss even harder to fill.

Then there’s productivity loss. Capital that would otherwise have gone into making the working population more productive has flowed to the war effort. Need capital for next generation AI research? Sorry, it’s needed for that tank production line. Need capital for updating highways and new bridges? Sorry, that’s needed this month’s production of ballistic missiles.

I still haven’t even mentioned the destruction of Russia’s international prestige, its diplomatic relations with the West, and ruin of historic export markets. We’re watching a country mortgage its future for lackluster territorial gains in a European backwater with no end in sight.

***

Putin made his fateful decision based on bad intelligence, an overestimation of Russian capabilities, and hubris. He gambled away Russia’s future in the hopes of reestablishing the old Russian hegemon. As we enter the fifth year of a conflict that was not expected to last longer than 3 days, I have no doubt history will judge him severely. Pandora’s Box of war will always be more difficult to close than open, and the people of Ukraine will suffer the consequences as a result.

There used to be a time in baseball where hitting 100 mph as a pitcher was special. There’s a certain speed upon which the human eye literally doesn’t have enough time to process ball vs. strike when a pitch is thrown from 60 feet, and it’s theorized that inhibiting factor starts at about 100 mph.

Growing up, the images of Randy Johnson or Roger Clemens instilled fear in the hearts of batters strictly due to their arm’s velocity. Nowadays, if you’re a D1 pitcher that can’t hit at least 97, you better have a viscous slider or have ability to paint those corners.

The title of this first post mentions hypersonics. “Is he really about to start his blog off with comparing hypersonic weapons to America’s pastime?” You bet your ass I am. Because now if your military doesn’t operate hypersonic weapons, you might as well stay at home.

Nothing embodies this series of events more than hypersonic missiles. When it comes to cruise missiles, drones, radar, fifth generation aircraft, and air defense, I could realistically paint a prettier picture of America’s dominance. Although the lead in these fields has been narrowed, I’d venture to take the debate stage and argue the Pentagon still holds the torch. When it comes to hypersonics, my argument breaks down. The Pentagon has found itself completely flat footed by the efforts of Russia and even more so the Chinese to the point it is now scrambling to field even a single program for operational use.

America’s history with hypersonic weapons is the perfect encapsulation of its lost decades of weapon development spanning back to the 90’s. If you’re unfamiliar, that’s a topic worthy of it’s own post (or, frankly, novel). In summary, America got embroiled in a Global War on Terror for 20 years where it focused its efforts on defeating IEDs, goat herders with AK-47s, and cave systems, while her enemies pursued research on how to defeat American aircraft carrier battle groups. In essence, the greatest military in the history of human existence got complacent, and because of that, it has witnessed it’s dominance gap in several areas of critical weapons research and development become not only narrowed but in certain fields fully surpassed.

To take a quick step back, perhaps it’d be helpful to define exactly what makes something hypersonic. So, beyond just being a general’s favorite buzzword these days, the most common definition has to do with speed, specifically anything flying faster than Mach 5. However, this definition actually breaks down a bit. It’s not just speed, but the ability to maneuver at said speed. Technically speaking, the German V-2 rocket deployed during WWII traveled at hypersonic speeds, but no one would consider that more than an early ballistic missile. No, modern hypersonics require maneuvering re-entry vehicles. Whether that’s using fins, ducts, or some other control surface, your typical Cold War ICBMs don’t count.

Hypersonics, for the most part, can be separated into two categories: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM). The first are just as they sound, aerodynamic vehicles that re-enter Earth’s atmosphere after being powered up to hypersonic speeds from some other power source, typically a ballistic missile, and glide itself onto its target, maneuvering if necessary.

HCMs also need an external source to get it up to speed in order to function such as rockets or other aircraft. However, they utilize their own on board engine to maintain hypersonic speeds, commonly known as scramjets or ramjets. They will typically travel at slower speeds than HGVs, but because they have their on engine on board, maneuvering will be less taxing on them.

So why are they so sought after? Essentially, they are able to more easily defeat very expensive ballistic missile defense systems currently in play. Why? Well, if you venture back to that graphic above, ballistic missile trajectories are very easy to predict, and, therefore, intercept. 30 seconds after a ballistic missile is launched, a sophisticated radar can accurately predict its entire flight path. And if you can predict where a missile will be and when it will be there, you can intercept it. Hypersonics can maneuver mid-flight, therefore, making it much more difficult to intercept.

So why is this useful? They become an incredibly useful weapon if you need something very important destroyed in a very short amount of time, think strategic long range radar arrays, aircraft carriers, or command and control bunkers at the beginning of a conflict. If you suddenly need an enemy’s primary radar to be taken out to allow your other strike packages to safely engage other targets in the area, it’s useful to have a weapon that can reliably survive it’s flight onto said target.

Okay, so that’s out of the way.

I wanted this post to mostly focus on recent developments out of the September 2025 Chinese military parade, but I’ve now realized it may be impossible to discuss without proper context. I think a wider discussion on current hypersonic programs is a topic for a later post, so the immediate following are four newly presented missiles China graced the world with only a few short months ago.

YJ-15

Among the first new anti-ship missiles that were revealed at the parade was the YJ-15, which appears to combine supersonic speeds with extended range to challenge traditional naval defenses such as gun-based close-in weapon systems (CIWSs).

Believed to be powered by a ramjet engine, the missile features an axisymmetric four-inlet air intake and a streamlined fuselage. This design enables the missile to sustain high-speed flight while minimizing drag.

The YJ-15 is estimated to have an overall length of about 6.5 m and a diameter of about 0.5 m. Given these dimensions, it likely weighs about 1,500 kg including a 200 kg warhead.

These physical characteristics, along with its compact stabilizing fins, suggest a configuration optimized for maneuverability during mid-course flight without the need for large deployable wings.

Given its physical characteristics and propulsion system, the YJ-15 is probably able to achieve speeds in excess of Mach 5, with an estimated range of between 1,200 and 1,800 km.

Furthermore, these characteristics and structural features suggest it is intended for air launch, most likely from the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF’s) fleet of H-6 strategic bombers. This aircraft features the necessary clearance and reinforced pylons to carry such a weapon externally, and its operational profile aligns with China’s doctrine of long-range stand-off strikes.

Air-launch capability not only extends the missile’s effective reach but also provides flexibility in deployment, allowing PLAAF bombers to operate from secure bases while projecting power deep into contested maritime zones.

Operationally, the YJ-15 has likely been designed to engage high-value naval targets such as aircraft carriers and large surface combatants. Its supersonic speed and ability to execute evasive maneuvers during the terminal phase significantly reduce reaction times for adversary defense systems, complicating interception.

While primarily intended for maritime strike, the missile’s likely performance envelope suggests a potential secondary land-attack role.

The introduction of the YJ-15 underscores China’s commitment to strengthening its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) posture in the Indo-Pacific. By fielding a weapon that combines speed, range, and flexible deployment options, the PLAN will enhance its capacity to deter or disrupt carrier strike groups and other surface forces operating within contested maritime regions.

YJ-17

The YJ-17 features an elongated, needle-like nose that has likely been engineered to minimize wave drag and reduce thermal stress during atmospheric re-entry and sustained hypersonic flight.

This sharply tapered forebody also helps maintain laminar flow at extreme speeds, ensuring stability while reducing the heat load on the missile’s leading edges.

The absence of any visible air intake confirms that the YJ-17 does not employ air-breathing propulsion like a scramjet but instead relies on a solid-fuel booster for its initial acceleration before transitioning to an unpowered glide phase.

This is a configuration that is typically employed by boost-glide weapons, which exploit altitude and velocity to achieve extended range without continuous propulsion.

The YJ-17 is estimated to have an overall length of about 9 m and a diameter of about 0.5 m. The missile’s fuselage is smooth and uninterrupted, and this reduces aerodynamic drag and radar cross-section. It will likely be able to achieve maximum speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 8.

Unlike subsonic cruise missiles that feature large deployable wings for lift, the YJ-17 employs a waverider design, generating lift from the shockwaves created at hypersonic speeds. This approach allows the missile to maintain altitude and maneuver without sacrificing velocity.

Small, rear-mounted control surfaces on its warhead provide fine adjustments during glide, enabling the missile to execute unpredictable lateral movements and skip-glide maneuvers in the upper atmosphere. These control surfaces have likely been incorporated to provide the YJ-17 with the ability to evade interception by complicating tracking and disrupting targeting systems of missile defense systems.

The YJ-17 has likely been designed with thermal protection measures incorporating advanced heat-resistant composites and ablative coatings to withstand temperatures associated with flights that occur between Mach 5 and Mach 8.

The missile’s overall length and diameter indicate compatibility with vertical launch systems (VLSs) on large surface combatants such as Type 055 destroyers, as well as external carriage by China’s fleet of H-6 bombers.

This versatility in deployment reflects a design philosophy aimed at integrating the YJ-17 into multiple strike platforms, reinforcing China’s layered maritime denial strategy.

Operationally, the YJ-17 will likely be deployed to deliver precision strikes against high-value naval targets such as major surface combatants, amphibious assault vessels, and aircraft carriers.

YJ-19

Among the new missiles revealed at the parade, the YJ-19 was perhaps the most visually striking given the lack of weapons with a similar form factor within China’s present arsenal.

The weapon’s nose section is particularly distinctive given its apparent attempt to accommodate a scramjet intake system while maintaining a highly aerodynamic profile for hypersonic flight.

Unlike conventional missile noses that are typically sharp or ogival for drag reduction, the YJ-19 features a slightly blunted, integrated intake configuration that channels airflow more efficiently into the scramjet engine.

In terms of its physical dimensions, the YJ-19 is estimated to be about 6 m in overall length with a diameter of about 533 mm, matching the constraints of submarine torpedo tubes.

Its overall weight is believed to be around 2,000 kg, including the warhead. These dimensions and physical attributes suggest that the YJ-19 can achieve speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10, with a range of approximately 500 km.

Central to the YJ-19’s design is its scramjet propulsion system, which appears to have been designed with fuel efficiency considerations while allowing the missile to maintain extreme velocity throughout its trajectory.

The streamlined fuselage and ventral air intake are characteristic of hypersonic architecture, while small stabilizing fins provide the agility required for mid-course maneuvers.

Given these physical attributes, the YJ-19 has likely been conceived to provide the PLAN with a hypersonic missile that is endowed with the stealth advantages associated with submarine deployments.

With its ability to be deployed from standard 533 mm torpedo tubes, it is likely that the YJ-19 will eventually be integrated across the PLAN’s fleet of in-service submarines.

Deployment of the YJ-19 is expected to focus on strategic maritime zones, including the South China Sea and Western Pacific, where control of sea lanes is central to regional security dynamics.

By combining the stealth of underwater launch with hypersonic speed, the missile compresses adversary reaction times and complicates interception efforts.This capability significantly enhances China’s ability to disrupt deployment plans of its adversaries’ surface fleets, posing a formidable challenge to carrier strike groups and other high-value naval assets.

The introduction of the YJ-19 also signals China’s growing proficiency in hypersonic technology, placing it among a select group of countries capable of fielding submarine-launched hypersonic cruise missiles.

When viewed alongside other systems such as the YJ-21 air- and ship-launched anti-ship missile and the DF-17 land-based ballistic missile, the YJ-19 signals China’s intention to adopt a layered approach to maritime strike, combining long-range ballistic options with agile, high-speed cruise missiles.

YJ-20

Another new missile revealed at the parade was the YJ-20, which appears to combine advanced aerodynamics, hypersonic propulsion, and precision guidance capabilities.

It features a biconical design, and this suggests a multistage configuration compatible with VLSs on major surface combatants such as the Type 055 destroyer.

While official specifications are undisclosed, assessments indicate a large missile with substantial payload capacity, indicating a role as a strategic asset in China’s naval arsenal. It has an overall length between 8 and 10 mand a diameter between 80 and 120 cm.

In terms of its propulsion system, the YJ-20 likely employs a solid rocket booster for initial acceleration, transitioning to a scramjet engine for sustained hypersonic cruise.

Given this propulsion configuration and its form factor, the estimated speed of the YJ-20 likely lies between Mach 6 and Mach 7 during cruise, with terminal velocities potentially reaching Mach 9.

This performance, coupled with an estimated operational range between 1,500 and 2,000 km, enables deep strike capability across the Indo-Pacific theatre.

The weapon’s guidance likely consists of an integration of BeiDou satellite-based navigation systems, active radar homing, and imaging infrared seekers, ensuring resilience against electronic countermeasures and precision targeting of high-value assets.

With these characteristics, the YJ-20 will be a cornerstone of China’s A2/AD doctrine given its ability to penetrate layered defenses and deliver kinetic energy at hypersonic speeds, making it exceptionally difficult to intercept with current missile defense systems.

The YJ-20 will also play a large part in the PLAN’s strategy to counter aircraft carriers in the region, underscoring the service’s long-held ambition to alter the regional balance of power by challenging US and allied naval dominance.

Integration into the Larger Force

These four developments add to an already mind-boggling stockpile of hypersonic missiles the Chinese military currently employ. It was already well known the People’s Liberation Army (PLA i.e. Chinese military) had at its disposal the DF-21D (the carrier killer), DF-26, DF-17, DF-27 (the Guam Killer), and the YJ-21.

I would argue the issue here isn’t necessarily the U.S.’s ability to intercept these various weapons. In both the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Ukraine, American made weapons have time and again proven the technical feasibility to defeat these types of threats. I would venture to think the Pentagon’s fear is two-fold: (1) the shear amount of weapons that have been produced thus far and (2) the range of platforms these threats can be launched from.

For the first fear, we’re talking about missiles in the thousands. Current American ballistic missile defense possesses stockpiles of THAAD and SM-3 at a combined ~1,000 interceptors for both sea-based and land-based assets. When you take into account that these interceptors would be launched at decoys as well as 2-for-1s to guarantee successful intercepts, American missile defense falls woefully short. This is the type of shortfall that will lose you a war. If within the first 8 hours of conflict China is able to obliterate the airbases at Guam and Japan, as well as negate any aircraft carrier advantage, you’re talking about Randy Johnson trying to pitch Game 7 with a 15 lb. weight strapped to his arm.

Now is usually the time where an analyst provides the solution. I don’t have one. And neither does the Pentagon. The current best course of action could be a variety of strategies: (1) significantly increase the rate of production on interceptors (2) disperse your Pacific assets to as many hard to hit air bases as possible (3) produce strategic long-range strike assets that can destroy enemy launchers before missiles are airborne (4) pray.

The correct path is to employ all aforementioned strategies, but that doesn’t solve the huge elephant (RIP Alabama football) in the room: China’s ability to mass produce these weapons at rates the world has never seen. That’s an issue that will take a WWII herculean effort to solve.