This will be Part 1 in a 2 part series focusing on recent Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) developments and trends.
Back in February 2026, satellite images were taken over Bohai Shipbuilding’s yard at Huludao, Liaoning, where China builds its nuclear submarines. Initially, the images were assumed to be another Type 093, probably an 093B variant given this shipyard has been launching two boats annually for some time now.
After more extensive analysis from China watchers, it has been determined through higher resolution images that the new construction featured design characteristics consistent with a new class altogether: the Type 095.
The 095 designation has been part of Western analysis of the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy aka the Chinese Navy) for a long time. It appeared in US Navy and Pentagon-adjacent assessments and academic work in the mid-2000s as the planned successor to the Type 093. For most of that period it was a name with guesses attached, not a visible boat. Beijing has yet to officially acknowledge the new class, nearly everything public about these boats comes from satellite imagery and open-source analysis rather than official statements.
Nonetheless, based on the limited analysis that can be achieved through satellite images, the new class most likely represents a major leap in technology and capability for the PLAN, who is quickly closing the gap with its American, British, and Russian counterparts in this field.
Before diving into the Type 095 details, some quick history for context:
For the longest time, Chinese submarines were viewed as a bit of a joke by the US Navy. As recent as the Type 091 Han class, Chinese subs suffered from excessive noise and limited capability. As such, the Pentagon’s focus has historically stayed on Russian boat launches and tracking in the North Atlantic.
In the early 2000s, a new class emerged designated the Type 093. Design work reportedly drew on lessons from a now-ended cooperative effort with Russia, and the program aimed to close the long-standing gap between Chinese and Western/Russian SSNs. As a general overview of each 093 increment:
Type 093 (Shang I). Two boats were built, the first entering service in the early 2000s. These were first-generation Shang-class submarines, serving largely as a technology demonstrator and operational stepping stone rather than a mature frontline design. They retained significant acoustic shortcomings relative to contemporary Western boats.
Type 093A (Shang II). Four boats were commissioned between 2015 and 2018. The 093A introduced a longer, more streamlined sail, improving hydrodynamics and sensor arrangement. Analysts believe the final two boats of this batch may have incorporated acoustic dampening mounts derived from later-generation Russian submarine technology — potentially making them China’s first genuinely quiet submarines, a meaningful leap from the earlier Type 093 and 091 classes.
Type 093B (Shang III). This variant, under construction since around 2022, added a 24-cell vertical launch system (VLS) enabling land-attack and anti-ship cruise missile strikes (commonly linked to the YJ-18) in addition to torpedoes, alongside a pump-jet propulsor. Bohai Shipyard in Huludao has launched an estimated 7 to 8 093B hulls at a pace of roughly 2 per year, demonstrating serial production capacity.

This is a commercially available satellite image of the Type 093B on a floating platform from 2022, the quality is crap so bear with me. The circle is around what’s called a pump jet type of propulsion. This would be a first for China. Prior to this development, all Chinese SSNs utilized the traditional propeller driven propulsion. Pump jet is considered more technologically complex and, most importantly, quieter than propellers by producing less cavitation (air bubbles).
It’s not state of the art, the first submarine with pump jet technology was the British Trafalgar class HMS Turbulent, launched in 1982.
Pump jets allow subs to travel at higher speeds while creating less noise. One drawback to pump jets is that at lower speeds, they are energy inefficient meaning they require much more energy than propellers otherwise would at the same speed. In simplistic terms, more power typically equals more noise. The emergence of the pump jet, therefore, suggests Chinese submarine nuclear power plant technology has advanced enough to overcome this drawback. Nuclear power plants are more complex and more expensive but much quieter than their electric-diesel counterparts. The name of the game in hunting SSNs is sound, the quieter the better.

The hull diameter of the new 093B appeared to be the same as the 093A before it. In submarine design, most Russian and Chinese boats were designed with a double hull. The inner hull would store everything internal to the submarine itself. There is then a layer of sound insulation between the inner hull and outer hull. Having a double hull makes the boat quieter, but creates a lot of wasted space (Russian inner hulls were as much as 20% narrower than the outer hulls). American boats going back to the Los-Angeles class have had single hulls allowing more efficient spacial use while still maintaining higher levels of quietness.
Make no mistake though, the Type 093B was the first Chinese SSN that began to brush up against its American adversaries in capability. If you don’t believe me, in 2024 retired Vice Admiral Joseph Sestak Jr. claimed the latest Chinese SSNs were not being picked up by passive sonar devices. Sidenote: passive sonar just listens for noise as a sub passes close-by, active sonar is the loud PING you hear from the movies. It’s essentially echolocation, using sound waves to find objects in the water by bouncing them off said object and waiting for the echo back.
Active sonar requires the enemy boat to be within a few dozen kilometers of your boat. Also, by utilizing active sonar, you give away your own position. Passive is more preferred as its safer and gives you early warning.
Additionally, a declassified report from the Navy claimed that, after a deployment of a Virginia class SSN in 2024, the passive sonar data was analyzed. The analysis showed that Chinese subs had been following the Virginia class without its knowledge, hinting at their ability to evade the American passive sonar systems onboard.
One last point on the 093, it’s a good example of how the Chinese defense industry develops new platforms. Typically, the first two weapons built will be prototypes (although capable of operational use) to learn about any flaws, what can be improved, and to develop doctrine (Type 093). Then a few years later, a second round of prototype will launch with the aforementioned improvements included (Type 093A), until a final design is chosen for full rate production (Type 093B).

Type 095
I want to make clear much of what will be written is speculation based on western analysts.
The various Type 093 class types have been tried and matured up to this point. The introduction of he X shaped stern as well as larger hull (13 meters vs. 11.5 meters on the 093B) suggests the above image is indeed an entirely new class.
It’s a great example as to why this is a new class versus just another upgrade. Let’s break it down:
The Hull: From Modified to Clean Sheet
The Type 093B is, structurally, still a descendant of a 1990s-era design. China kept widening it, lengthening the sail, and bolting on new systems for twenty years, but underneath it’s the same lineage as the original Type 093.
The Type 095 breaks that pattern. Analysts are calling it a clean-sheet design — not an evolution of the 093 hull, but a new one built around different assumptions from the start. The numbers back this up: the 095 is roughly a meter wider in the beam (12-13m vs. the 093B’s ~10-11m) and displaces somewhere between 7,900 and 10,700 tons submerged, compared to the 093B’s 6,700-7,000 tons. That’s not a trim upgrade — that’s a different size class of submarine, with room for more reactor power, more weapons, and more quieting technology than the older hull could ever accommodate.
The upgrade, in plain terms: more internal volume means more of everything else on this list actually fits.
Propulsion: Pump-Jet Gets a Full Redesign
This one’s interesting because the 093B already had a pump-jet — it was the first Shang variant to get one. So the 095 isn’t introducing pump-jet propulsion to the lineage; it’s refining it. Satellite imagery through 2026 (most notably analysis from Janes in September) confirmed the 095’s pump-jet, and some analysts believe the reactor and drivetrain behind it are a more substantial step up — possibly incorporating turbo-electric elements, though that part is still speculative.
The upgrade: less “first pump-jet” and more “pump-jet done right,” paired with more shaft power to push a bigger hull at comparable or better speeds.
Acoustic Signature: The Real Point of the Whole Program
This is arguably the single biggest story. China’s SSNs have historically been loud as I’ve discussed above. The 095 piles on quieting technology that the 093B only partially had: shock-isolating raft mounts for machinery, more extensive anechoic tiling, and a hull/propulsion combination specifically engineered to suppress the kind of cavitation and vibration noise that makes a submarine easy to find.
The upgrade: the 093B was “quieter than the 093A.” The 095 is explicitly trying to be quiet in absolute terms — competitive with, not just better than its predecessor.
Control Surfaces: X-Rudder Replaces Cruciform
The 093B kept the traditional cruciform (+-shaped) stern control surfaces. The 095 appears to use an X-rudder configuration instead — four angled control surfaces instead of four perpendicular ones. This is a pattern you see on some of the most advanced Western and Russian boats, and it offers two real benefits: better maneuverability, especially in shallow water, and redundancy — if one surface is damaged, the sub doesn’t lose a full axis of control the way a cruciform design can.
The upgrade: a tangible handling and survivability improvement, not just a cosmetic one.
Weapons: Bigger Tubes for Bigger Missiles
The 093B was the first Shang variant with a VLS at all — 24 cells for cruise missiles like the YJ-18, bolted onto a hull originally designed around torpedo tubes alone. The 095 reportedly carries fewer VLS cells (estimates suggest around eight) but sized for substantially larger weapons — potentially including hypersonic glide vehicles like the YJ-17, or scramjet-powered cruise missiles in the YJ-19/YJ-20 family (go read my very first post if you want a detailed breakdown).
The upgrade: fewer tubes, bigger punch. This is less “more missiles” and more “missiles the 093B’s VLS physically couldn’t carry.”
Sensors: An Incremental but Real Step
Both boats are expected to carry flank array and towed array sonar, but the 095’s suite is reported as more advanced across active and passive flank arrays, with both low- and high-frequency towed array options. This is the least dramatic upgrade on the list, mostly because sensor improvements are iterative by nature.
The Bottom Line
None of this means the 093B becomes obsolete — China is still building and operating it, and it’ll likely remain the backbone of the PLAN’s SSN force for years while the 095 works through fitting-out and sea trials. But the upgrade path is coherent: the 093B solved “can we add missiles and a pump-jet to our existing design,” and the 095 is solving “what if we didn’t start from that design at all.”
One honest caveat worth keeping front and center: none of this is confirmed by Beijing. Every spec above comes from satellite imagery and analyst inference, not an official spec sheet. The direction is clear. The exact numbers are still a work in progress — for us and, quite possibly, for China’s own test program.
This development follows others within the western establishment of complacency. American designers have been comfortable keeping a generation’s length ahead of Russian counterparts. We are entering an era where China legitimately challenges American advantages here: propulsion, stealth, weapons (they’re ahead), electronics, etc.
But this is just the qualitative aspect, what about the quantitative? The story, unfortunately for Western observers, gets much more negative much more quickly in this regard, as I will discuss in Part 2 of this story.
You think anyone at the Pentagon is laughing anymore? I certainly am not.

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